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Abstract
Intuitionistic and linear logics can be used to specify the operational semantics of transition
systems in various ways. We consider here two encodings: one uses linear logic and maps states
of the transition system into formulas, and the other uses intuitionistic logic and maps states
into terms. In both cases, it is possible to relate transition paths to proofs in sequent calculus. In
neither encoding, however, does it seem possible to capture properties, such as simulation and
bisimulation, that need to consider all possible transitions or all possible computation paths. We
consider augmenting both intuitionistic and linear logics with a proof theoretical treatment of
de/nitions. In both cases, this addition allows proving various judgments concerning simulation
and bisimulation (especially for noetherian transition systems). We also explore the use of in/-
nite proofs to reason about in/nite sequences of transitions. Finally, combining de/nitions and
induction into sequent calculus proofs makes it possible to reason more richly about properties
of transition systems completely within the formal setting of sequent calculus. c© 2002 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Structural operational semantics [30] or natural semantics [19] are familiar approaches
to the speci/cation of computations. These semantic speci/cations can generally be
encoded into logic so that atomic formulas are used to encode judgments about the
computation (such as “program M has value V ” or “process P has a c transition to
process Q”) and formulas are used to encode inference rules. Such encodings generally
yield /rst-order Horn clauses, although richer sets of clauses have also been used, such
as subsets of intuitionistic logic with quanti/cation at higher-types (like those imple-
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mented in Isabelle [29] and Prolog [28]). These encodings have been successfully
used in the speci/cation of a wide range of computations, including the evaluation
of functional programming languages [4, 15, 27], abstract machines [16], and process
calculi [26]. Various recent papers suggest that linear logic [11] can be used as well to
make this style of speci/cation more expressive. For example, speci/cations of imper-
ative and concurrent programming language features [5, 6, 9, 23, 24] and the sequential
and concurrent (pipe-line) semantics of a RISC processor [6] have been modeled using
linear logic.
A key property of such encodings is that there exists a computation in a certain
system if and only if there is a proof of a certain judgment from the set of clauses that
encodes that computation system. If we were interested in capturing properties based
on all possible transitions or computations, the conventional proof theory techniques
for intuitionistic and linear logic do not appear to suEce since they do not provide
a direct way to manage the notion of “for all proofs” within the logic itself. Using
terminology from Hennessy [17], conventional uses of proof theory provide means to
capture may behavior but not must behavior of a transition system.
In this paper we investigate the use of a recently studied extension to proof systems
that will allow us to capture certain kinds of must behaviors. This extension is based
on the notion of de7nition. While de/nitions and theories are similar in that they
both contain formulas useful for constructing a proof, the notion of de/nition carries
the added intention that there are no other ways by which the de/ned concept can
be established. Such a notion of de/nition has been investigated in proof systems in
recent years: HallnGas considered similar notions in the context of “partial inductive
de/nitions” [13]; HallnGas and Schroeder-Heister considered classical and intuitionistic
logic with proof rules incorporating de/nitions [14, 31], and in the note [12], Girard
independently developed a similar use of de/nitions for linear logic. More recently,
McDowell and Miller have incorporated de/nitions into an intuitionistic proof system
that also includes natural number induction [21, 22]. In all of these cases, it can be
shown that if certain restrictions are placed on the structure of de/nitions, de/ned
concepts have left- and right-introduction rules that enjoy a cut-elimination theorem.
Some examples of using such a de/nition mechanism have been given for equality
reasoning [12, 31], forms of program completion in logic programming [14, 32], the
GCLA language project [3], and for meta-level reasoning about logical inference [21].
To provide a general setting for our analysis of the use of de/nitions within proofs,
we shall work with abstract transition systems (ats) instead of structural operational
semantics or natural semantics, since these can be seen as special cases of abstract
transition systems. Section 2 provides some background on the proof theory notions
that we shall need, including the concept of de/nitions. Section 3 contains background
notions surrounding ats’s. We then consider two ways to encode an ats into logic. In
Section 4, they are encoded directly into linear logic in such a way that atomic formu-
las denote members of the ats and the rules of linear logic are used to mimic actual
transitions. Section 5 considers a diJerent approach to encoding an ats: there, members
of an ats are encoded as terms and the basic judgment about labeled transitions is rep-
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resented by an atomic formula. In both of these encodings, the use of de/nitions allows
such must behaviors as simulation to be captured for noetherian ats’s. Section 6 brieKy
considers using in/nite proofs to deal with non-noetherian transition systems. Finally,
in Section 7, we consider adding induction and discuss how that allows establishing
richer properties of ats’s.
2. Adding denitions to sequent calculus
A de7nition is a countable set of clauses, and clauses are expressions of the form
∀ Lx[p(Lt),B], where the free variables of B are free in some term of the list of terms
Lt, and all variables free in (some term in) Lt are contained in the list of variables Lx.
The formula B is the body and p(Lt) is the head of that clause. We do not assume
that distinct clauses have distinct predicates p in their head: de/nitions act to de/ne
predicates by mutual recursion. The symbol, is not a logical connective: it is used just
to denote de/nitional clauses. In Section 4 we shall consider the addition of de/nitions
to linear logic and in Section 5 through the end of the paper we consider adding
de/nitions to intuitionistic logic. In either case, we shall assume that our logic is
typed, say, in the style of the Church’s Simple Theory of Types [7]. Quanti/cation
over predicates will not be used in this paper; we shall assume that formulas have
type o, and other types will be introduced when needed. We shall generally treat types
implicitly, but shall include types in examples to help make the speci/cations more
readable.
We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the usual two-sided sequent calculus
presentation of intuitionistic logic [10] and linear logic [11]. In this paper, we consider
sequents of the form →B, where B is a formula and  is either a multiset or a set
of formulas, depending on whether we are working in linear or intuitionistic logic. We
shall also assume that the reader is familiar with substitutions and their basic properties.
Given two expressions A and A′, a uni7er for A and A′ is a substitution  such that
A=A′. Uni/ers may map variables to open terms. The set of uni/ers for A and A′
is denoted as unif (A; A′). For the sake of generality, we will assume an underlying
equality theory, and A=A′ here means that A and A′ are equal in that equality
theory. (In general, this will be the intended meaning of = whenever written between
two terms or two atomic formulas.) A complete set of uni7ers (csu) for A and A′ is
a set S of substitutions such that (i) for each ∈ S,  is a uni/er of A and A′, and
(ii) for every uni/er  of A and A′, there exists a ∈ S which is more general than ;
namely, there exists a substitution  such that = . In general, there can be many
diJerent csu’s for A and A′. We use the function csu(A; A′) to pick one of these csu’s
in an arbitrary but /xed fashion. In some cases, like when the equality is syntactic
identity, there exists a most general uni/er and, therefore, the csu can be taken to
be a singleton. All the examples in this paper fall into this category except for some
examples in Sections 5 and 7, where the ; ; -equality theory of simply typed -terms
is used: in that theory, it is possible that two uni/able terms have no singleton csu [18].
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Left- and right-introduction rules for atomic formulas will be given for a /xed def-
inition and equality theory. The right rule is given as
→ B
→ A defR; where A = H for some clause ∀ Lx:[H , B]:
If we think of a de/nition as a logic program, then this rule is essentially the same as
backchaining.
Left introduction of de/ned atoms requires considering uni/ers between two atoms.
We consider various formulations of this rule. The /rst version [31] is given as
{B;O→ C |  ∈ unif (A;H) for some clause ∀ Lx:[H , B]}
A; → C defLunif :
The variables Lx in this rule need to be chosen so that they are not free in any formula of
the lower sequent. Specifying a set of sequents as the premise in the left introduction
rule means that each sequent in the set is a premise of the rule. This rule uses all
uni/ers between the de/ned atom A that is introduced and the heads of clauses.
Another form of the rule, using csu’s, was given in [8].
{B;O→ C |  ∈ csu(A;H) for some clause ∀ Lx:[H , B]}
A; → C defL:
Again the variables Lx need to be chosen so that they are not free in any formula of
the lower sequent.
Notice that for both of these rules, the set of premises can be in/nite since de/nitions
and the sets unif (A;H) and csu(A;H) can be in/nite. The advantage of the second
rule is that there are situations where csu(A;H) is /nite while the corresponding set
unif (A;H) is in/nite.
These two left-introduction rules for de/ned atoms can be proved equivalent in the
following strong sense.
Proposition 1. A proof using defLunif can be converted to a proof using defL by
replacing each occurrence of defLunif with defL and by pruning away the proofs of
unnecessary premises. Vice versa; a proof using defL can be converted into a proof
using defLunif by replacing each occurrence of defL with defLunif and adding proofs
of the additional premises.
Proof. The /rst part is obvious. The second part is based on the observation that
the proofs for the additional premises can be built as instances of the proofs of the
premises of defL. An analogous result was proved in [20, 22]. The only diJerence
is that in defLunif we consider uni/ers instead of pairs of substitutions ;  such that
A=H. However the two formulation can be easily shown to be equivalent: we can
always -convert the variables Lx in ∀ Lx:[H,B] so that ∪  is a uni/er for A and H .
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In this paper we will consider systems based on the defL rule. As a consequence
of Proposition 1, it does not matter which complete set of uni/ers is chosen by the
function csu (used in the de/nition of defL).
The left- and right-introduction rules for de/ned atoms have diJerent “quanti/ca-
tional” interpretations when read bottom-up: defR replaces A with the body of some
clause in the de/nition whose head matches with A, while defL replaces A with
the body of all the clauses whose heads unify with A. These diJerent quanti/cational
aspects play an important role in our uses of de/nitions.
We now show a basic result about defL: The order in which atoms are introduced
on the left does not matter. In other words, two applications of defL permute over
each other. In order to prove this result, we /rst need to establish a basic property of
uni/ers.
Proposition 2. Consider the expressions A1; A2; H1; H2. Let unif ((A1; A2); (H1; H2)) be
the set of uni7ers of the pairs (A1; A2) and (H1; H2) (that is; the substitutions which
unify simultaneously A1 with H1; and A2 with H2. We have
unif ((A1; A2); (H1; H2)) = {12 | 1 ∈ unif (A1; H1); 2 ∈ unif (A21; H21)};
where 12 is the usual composition of the substitutions 1 and 2.
Proof. To show the forward inclusion, let ∈ unif ((A1; A2); (H1; H2)). Let  denote the
empty substitution. The result follows by observing that ∈ unif (A1; H1), ∈ unif (A2;
H2), and = ”.
To show the converse inclusion, let 1 ∈ unif (A1; H1) and 2 ∈ unif (A21; H21). By
de/nition of 2, we have 12 ∈ unif (A2; H2). Furthermore, since equality is preserved
under substitution, we have 12 ∈ unif (A1; H1), which concludes the proof.
By applying Proposition 2 two times we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Given the expressions A1; A2; H1; H2; we have
{12 | 1 ∈ unif (A1; H1); 2 ∈ unif (A21; H21)}
= {′2′1 | ′2 ∈ unif (A2; H2); ′1 ∈ unif (A1′2; H1′2)}:
We are now able to show that two instances of defL permute over each other.
Proposition 4. If we have a proof of the sequent A1; A2; →C using defL with
respect to A1 as the last rule; and defL for each of the premises of that rule with
respect to (an instance of) A2; then we also have a proof using defL with respect to
A2 as the last rule; and defL for each of the premises with respect to (an instance
of) A1.
Proof. Given Proposition 1, it is suEcient to prove this result for defLunif . Suppose
that the hypothesis of the proposition (reformulated in terms of defLunif ) holds. Then
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the set of premises at the second level is
{B112; B22;O12→C12 | 1 ∈ unif (A1; H1) for some clause ∀ Lx:[H1,B1];
and 2 ∈ unif (A21; H2) for some clause ∀ Ly:[H2 , B2]}:
Since the list Ly can be chosen so as not to intersect with the domain of 1, we can
replace H2 with H21, and B2 with B21. By Corollary 3 we have that the above set
is equal to
{B1′2′1; B2′2′1;O′2′1→C′2′1 |′2∈unif (A2; H2) for some clause ∀ Ly:[H2,B2];
and ′1 ∈ unif (A1′2; H1′2) for some clause ∀ Lx:[H1 , B1]}:
This set of sequents corresponds to the set of premises obtained by switching the order
of the last two defLunif inference rules in the original proof.
Admitting de/nitions in this fashion does not necessarily yield a proof system from
which cut can be eliminated: to achieve a cut-elimination result, certain restrictions
on de/nitions are needed. We present these restrictions on de/nitions when we deal
speci/cally with linear logic (Section 4) and intuitionistic logic (Section 5 through the
end of the paper).
If D is a de/nition, we write D→C to mean that →C is provable in the
underlying logic (intuitionistic or linear) possibly using the right introduction rule for
de/nitions, and we write D→C to mean that →C is provable possibly using
the left- and right-introduction rules for de/nitions. We write DB and DB as
abbreviations for D →B and D →B, respectively.
3. Abstract transition systems
The triple T=(; S; ) is an abstract transition system (ats) if  is a non-empty
set of actions, S is a non-empty set of states, and ⊆ S××S ( and S are assumed
to be disjoint). We write p a→ q if (p; a; q)∈ . If w∈∗ then we write p w⇒ q to mean
that p makes a transition to q along a path of actions given by w. More formally,
this relation is de/ned by induction on the length of w: thus p ⇒p and if p a→ r and
r w⇒ q then p aw⇒ q. For a state p, de/ne 〈〈p〉〉= {(a; q) | (p; a; q)∈ }. The ats T is
7nitely branching if, for each p, the set 〈〈p〉〉 is /nite. T is determinate if for every
state p and every action a, the set {q | (p; a; q)∈ } is either empty or a singleton.
T is noetherian if it contains no in/nite paths. In a noetherian ats we can de/ne the
measure of a state p, denoted by meas(p), as the ordinal number given by
meas(p) = lub({meas(q) + 1|p a→ q for some a});
where we assume lub(∅)= 0. If the ats is also /nitely branching then all its states have
/nite measure.
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Fig. 1. CCS transition rules.
The notions of simulation and bisimulation provide important judgments on pairs of
states in an abstract transition system. A good overview of relations on transitions sys-
tems (including simulation and bisimulation) can be found in [33]. A relation R⊆ S×S
is a simulation between p and q if and only if for every transition p a→p′, there exists
a transition q a→ q′, such that p′Rq′. The union of all simulations in an ats is also a
simulation in the ats and we denote it by ; that is, p q (read “q simulates p”)
holds if and only if there exists a simulation R such that pRq. If p q and qp
both hold, then p and q are similar.
A relation R is a bisimulation between p and q if and only if for every transition
p a→p′, there exists a transition q a→ q′ such that p′Rq′, and for every transition q a→ q′,
there exists a transition p a→p′ such that q′Rp′. The union of all bisimulations in an
ats is also a bisimulation in the ats and we denote it by ≡; that is, p ≡ q (read “p is
bisimilar to q”) holds if and only if there exists a bisimulation R such that pRq. It is
well-known that bisimilarity implies similarity but not vice versa: for a counterexample,
see Example 9.
To illustrate our results, we will consider throughout the paper a more concrete
example of an abstract transition system: the operational semantics of the concurrent
language CCS [26]. For convenience, we ignore the renaming and hiding combinators,
and concentrate on the sublanguage described by the grammar
p ::= 0 | x | a:p | p+ p | p|p | &xp;
where x ranges over process variables and a ranges over a non-empty set of actions
A, the set of the complementary actions LA= { La | a∈A}, and {'}, where ' =∈A∪ LA.
The intended meaning of these symbols is as follows: 0 represents the inactive
process, a:p represents a process pre/xed by the action a; + and | are choice and
parallel composition, respectively, and &x is the least /xed point operator, providing
recursion. The operational semantics of CCS is speci/ed by the transition rules in
Fig. 1.
CCS can be seen as an abstract transition system where =A ∪ LA ∪ {'}; S is
the set of all CCS expressions, and  is the set of transitions which are derivable
by the rules above. A 7nite CCS process is a CCS expression that does not contain
&. If S is restricted to the set of all /nite CCS processes, then the resulting ats is
noetherian.
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4. Linear logic specication of abstract transition systems
In this section, we will consider encoding abstract transition systems using linear
logic and de/nitions. We will, in fact, use only the connectives 1; ⊗ ;(, and ∃, whose
inference rules are given in Fig. 2, along with defL and defR from Section 2. Before
presenting our encoding, we state some properties of this combination of linear logic
and de/nitions.
The cut rule
1 → B B; 2 → C
1; 2 → C
is known to be admissible for this fragment of linear logic with de/nitions. This cut-
elimination result is given by Girard in [12] or from the main result in [31]. In general,
we shall only consider cut-free proofs when considering encodings of ats’s.
Generally, there are many proofs for the same sequent, and many of these diJer
only in the order in which inference rules are applied. In particular, many inference
rules permute over each other: if the order in which they are applied is switched, the
proof would still be achieved in essentially the same way. Consider, for example, a
proof that ends with the following two inference rules.
1; C→D 2→B
1; 2; B( C→D (L 3→E
1; 2; 3; B( C→D⊗E ⊗R:
These instances of the (L and ⊗R can be permuted to yield
1; C→D 3→E
1; 3; C→D⊗E ⊗R 2→B
1; 2; 3; B( C→D⊗E (L:
In the case where the formula B( C appears in the right premise of the ⊗R inference
rule, a corresponding permutation is also possible.
There are various pairs of inference rules that do not permute over each other. In
the following Lemma, we write R1=R2 to mean an occurrence of the inference rule
Fig. 2. A proof system for a fragment of linear logic. The rule ∃L has the proviso that y is not free in the
lower sequent.
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R1 over the inference rule R2. We do not need to consider permutations of two right-
introduction rules since sequents have only one formula on their right-hand side.
Lemma 5. The following pairs of inference rules do not permute over each other.
1R=1L ⊗R= ⊗L (L= ( R (L= ⊗L ∃R=∃L;
(L=defL ⊗R=defL ∃R=defL defR=defL:
All other pairs of inference rules permute.
Proof. We do not examine explicitly here all pairings of inference rules. Instead we
show only a few cases: most cases are similar and simple.
The case of nonpermutability of ⊗R=⊗L can be illustrated with the sequent
p⊗ q→ q⊗p: this has a proof with an occurrence of ⊗L below ⊗R but there
is no proof with ⊗R at the bottom. The other cases of nonpermutability can be
shown by presenting similar counterexamples.
Above, it has already been shown that the pair (L=⊗R permutes. Most of the
other cases of permutability can be reasoned about as simply. The only diEcult case
involves showing that two atomic formulas on the left of a sequent can be introduced
by the defL rule in either order: fortunately, this has already been proved in Sec-
tion 2 (Proposition 4). The cases for defL=⊗R and defL=⊗L require applying
substitutions to proofs, a notion formally de/ned in [20, 22].
To encode an ats in linear logic, we represent states as propositional constants.
Actions will be represented by functional constants of type ,→ ,, where , is a new
type. The sequence of actions, or trace, w= a1 · · · am (m¿ 0) from ∗ will be encoded
as the term w˜= w:a1(: : : (am w) : : :). (Here, the symbol denoting an action is also
used to denote the corresponding function symbol.) Function composition represents
the concatenation of traces: w1w2 is encoded as w˜1 ◦ w˜2 = w:w˜1(w˜2 w). Besides the
propositions that encode states, we need one other predicate tr of type (,→ ,)→ o.
Let ats1() be the de/nition given by the following set of clauses:
ats1() = {p, ∃W (tr(a ◦W )⊗ (tr(W )( q)) | (p; a; q) ∈ }:
Notice that the symbol denoting a state is also used to denote the corresponding logical
atom.
The following proposition shows how paths can be represented logically.
Proposition 6. Let (; S; ) be an ats. Then p w⇒ q if and only if
ats1()  ∀k((tr(k)( q)( (tr(w˜ ◦ k)( p)):
Proof. First notice that ats1() ∀k((tr(k) ( q) ( (tr(w˜ ◦ k) ( p)) if and only if
ats1() tr(w˜ ◦ k); tr(k)( q→p for any constant k of type ,→ ,.
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We prove the reverse direction by induction on the length of w. Assume w is  and
that ats1() tr(k); tr(k) ( q→p. The proof of this sequent cannot end with defL,
since the predicate tr is not assumed to be de/ned. The proof cannot end with defR,
since that would require the proof of tr(k)→ tr(a ◦ w′) for some w′, which is not
provable. So the sequent can only be proved if it is the conclusion of an (L; thus,
p and q are equal and p ⇒ q holds immediately.
If w is not empty then it is of the form au. The proof of the sequent tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k);
tr(k) ( q→p cannot end with defL, since tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k) is not a de/ned atom.
It cannot end with ( L, since that would require a proof of either → tr(k) or
tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k)→ tr(k), neither of which are provable. So the sequent must be the conse-
quence of defR, there must be an r such that p a→ r, and the proof must be structured
as follows:
tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k)→ tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k)
tr(u˜ ◦ k); tr(k)( q→ r
tr(k)( q→ tr(u˜ ◦ k)( r ( R
tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k); tr(k)( q→ tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k)⊗ (tr(u˜ ◦ k)( r) ⊗R
tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k); tr(k)( q→∃W (tr(a ◦W )⊗ (tr(W )( r)) ∃R
tr(a ◦ u˜ ◦ k); tr(k)( q→p defR:
This proof contains a subproof of tr(u˜◦k); tr(k)( q→ r. By the inductive hypothesis,
we have r u⇒ q and thus p au⇒ q.
The proof in the forward direction is also by induction of the length of w. If w
is empty, then p w⇒ q implies that p and q are equal, and thus the sequent tr(w˜ ◦
k); tr(k) ( q→p is provable (via (L and two uses of the initial rule). If w is
nonempty then it is of the form au and there is some r such that p a→ r u⇒ q. By the
inductive hypothesis, there is a proof of tr(u˜◦k); tr(k)( q→ r. If we add to that proof
the inference rules displayed above, we then get a proof of tr(a◦ u˜◦k); tr(k)( q→p.
We prove now that with this encoding (along with defL), simulation corresponds to
reverse linear implication. To do so, we introduce two new items. First, given a /xed
ats (; S; ) and (p; q)∈ S × S, a premise set for (p; q) is a set P⊆ S × S such that
for every a∈ and p′ ∈ S such that p a→p′ there exists a q′ ∈ S such that q a→ q′ and
(p′; q′)∈P. Premise sets need not exist, but if there is a simulation R that contains
(p; q) then there is a premise set P for that pair such that P⊆R. We restrict premise
sets to be minimal (assuming the axiom of choice). Notice also that premise sets can
be empty. Second, we introduce the following class of inference rules:
{p′→ q′ | (p′; q′) ∈ P}
p→ q SIM1;
where P is a premise set for (p; q). Notice that this rule is /nitary if the ats is /nitely
branching. Let SIM1→C denote the proposition that the sequent →C can be
proved using only the SIM1 inference rule.
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Lemma 7. Let (; S; ) be a noetherian ats and let p; q∈ S. Then ats1()p→ q if
and only if SIM1p→ q.
Proof. Assume ats1()p→ q. If the proof of this sequent uses only the initial rule,
then p and q are the same state. In a noetherian ats, a proof of p→p using only
the SIM1 inference rule can always be constructed, a result that follows from a simple
induction on meas(p). (This is the only use of the noetherian assumption in this proof.)
Otherwise, the only inference rules that can be applied to prove such a sequent are
either defR or defL since p and q are atomic formulas. By Lemma 5, occurrences
of defL can be permuted down over defR and the right-introduction rules for ∃; ⊗ ,
and (. So we can assume that the last inference rule used to prove this sequent is
defL, and thus the proof has the form
{∃W (tr(a ◦W )⊗ (tr(W )( p′))→ q |p a→p′}
p→ q defL:
Consider one of these premises, say, ∃W (tr(a ◦W )⊗ (tr(W ) ( p′))→ q. Given the
permutations of the inference rules listed in Lemma 5, we can assume that this premise
is obtained by left-introduction rules for ∃ and ⊗ , yielding the sequent tr(a◦w); tr(w)
( p′ → q where w is a variable. The proof of this sequent cannot end with defL
since tr(a ◦ w) is not a de/ned atom. It also cannot end with (L since this would
require a proof of either → tr(w) or tr(a ◦w)→ tr(w), neither of which are provable.
Therefore, the proof must end with defR, which yields the sequent
tr(a ◦ w); tr(w)( p′ → ∃W (tr(b ◦W )⊗ (tr(W )( q′));
where q b→ q′. There is a proof of this sequent, however, only if a= b and ∃W is
instantiated with w (using the ∃ right-introduction rule), bringing us to the sequent
tr(a ◦ w); tr(w)( p′ → tr(a ◦ w)⊗ (tr(w)( q′):
A proof of this sequent must end with the right-introduction rules for ⊗ and ( and
the left-introduction rule for (, and contain a subproof of the sequent p′→ q′. Thus,
if we collect all such pairs (p′; q′) into the set P, we have a premise set for (p; q)
and we have established an instance of the SIM1 rule. Since all these proof steps are
forced, this proves the completeness of SIM1.
The converse follows simply by noting that each instance of the SIM1 inference rule
can be built using several instances of inference rules from linear logic, one instance
of defL, and possibly several instances of defR.
Notice that for a noetherian ats we do not need instances of the initial sequent rule
to be used with de/ned atoms: a proof of p→p can be obtained using only the SIM1
rule or the corresponding combination of defL, defR, ∃L, ∃R, ⊗L, ⊗R, (L,
( R, and the initial rule for unde/ned atoms. This observation is similar to the one
that holds of most proof systems: the initial rule is needed to prove A→A only when
A is atomic; that is, when A has a non-logical symbol as its head symbol. When using
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ats1() as a de/nition, states become logical constants (in the sense that they have
left- and right-introduction rules), and hence we do not need any instance of the initial
rule. Notice, however, if we did admit the initial inference rule along with the SIM1
inference rule, the previous lemma could be extended to the non-noetherian case.
We can now establish our /rst proof theoretic connection to simulation.
Theorem 8. Let (; S; ) be a noetherian ats and let p; q∈ S. Then ats1()p→ q
if and only if q simulates p.
Proof. Given Lemma 7, we need only show that SIM1p→ q if and only if q simulates
p. First, assume that the sequent p→ q has a proof that contains only instances of the
SIM1 inference rule. Let R be the set of all pairs (r; s) such that the sequent r→ s has
an occurrence in that proof. It is easy to verify that R is a simulation.
Conversely, assume that q simulates p. Thus there is a simulation R such that pRq.
The proof is by complete induction on the measure of p, meas(p). Since pRq, there is
a premise set P⊆R for (p; q). If (p′; q′)∈P, then p′Rq′ and meas(p′)¡meas(p), so
we have by the induction hypothesis SIM1p′→ q′. Thus, we have proved SIM1p→ q.
This theorem states that in a noetherian ats, simulation can be identi/ed with the
logical connective ( via the encoding ats1(). As a consequence, logical equivalence of
p and q, namely the provability of both p( q and q( p, corresponds to similarity of
p and q, i.e. simulation in both directions. Notice that bisimilarity implies similarity but
does not coincide with it, as the following example shows. Hence logical equivalence
is coarser than bisimulation equivalence.
Example 9. Consider the transition system with one label a, states {p1; p2; p3; p4; q1;
q2; q3}, and transitions p1 a→p2; p2 a→p3; p1 a→p4; q1 a→ q2; q2 a→ q3. The relations
{(p1; q1); (p2; q2); (p3; q3); (p4; q2)} and {(q1; p1); (q2; p2); (q3; p3)}
witness the fact that q1 simulates p1 and p1 simulates q1, respectively. It is easy to
check, however, that there is no bisimulation that contains the pair (p1; q1).
As a consequence of this example, we see no way to make bisimilarity into a logical
connective; that is, into a constant of type o→ o→ o with left- and right-introduction
rules that enjoys cut-elimination. In the special case of noetherian and determinate ats,
however, similarity implies bisimilarity, and hence logical equivalence and bisimulation
equivalence coincide.
Proposition 10. Let (; S; ) be a noetherian and determinate ats and let p; q∈ S.
Then ats1()p( q and ats1() q( p if and only if p is bisimilar to q.
Proof. We prove that if the ats is noetherian and determinate then similarity and
bisimilarity coincide. The proposition then follows from Theorem 8. We show that
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similarity implies bisimularity by well-founded induction on meas(p). Consider a tran-
sition p a→p′. Since p q, there must exist a q′ such that q a→ q′ and p′ q′. Since
the ats is determinate, qp implies q′p′. Since meas(p′)¡meas(p), the inductive
hypothesis yields p′ ≡ q′. Symmetrically, for any q a→ q′, there exist p a→p′ such that
q′ ≡ p′. Therefore p ≡ q.
5. Encoding one-step transitions as atomic judgments
While using linear logic directly to encode transitions was rather natural and immedi-
ate, the resulting encoding will not be able to provide us information about bisimilarity
in many situations, as is illustrated in Example 9. To overcome this problem we give a
second encoding of abstract transition systems, this time encoding the relations between
states as predicates rather than logical connectives. Since this encoding will not need
linearity, it uses intuitionistic logic instead. De/nitions will play a role rather similar
to the one they played in the previous encoding.
Consider intuitionistic logic using the connectives  for true, ∧ for conjunction, ⊃
for implication, and ∀ and ∃ for universal and existential quanti/cation. Sequents for
this intuitionistic logic are of the form →B where  is a set of formulas and B
is a formula. The sequent calculus for this fragment of intuitionistic logic is given in
Fig. 3. Schroeder–Heister showed in [31] that if de/nitions do not contain implications
in clause bodies, then cut-elimination can be proved for intuitionistic logic extended
with defL and defR rules. However, we shall need a strong form of de/nition that
allows certain strati/ed occurrences of implications. In particular, we assume that each
predicate symbol p in the language has associated with it a natural number lvl(p),
the level of the predicate. The notion of level is then extended to formulas as fol-
lows. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is de/ned as follows: lvl(p(Lt))= lvl(p),
lvl()= 0, lvl(B ∧ C)= max(lvl(B); lvl(C)), lvl(B ⊃ C)= max(lvl(B) + 1; lvl(C)),
Fig. 3. A proof system for a fragment of intuitionistic logic. The rules ∀R and ∃L have the proviso that y
is not free in the lower sequent of that inference rule. The structural rules of exchange and contraction are
implicit in the use of sets on the left-hand side of the sequent arrow. The weakening rule is implicit in the
presence of  in the axioms.
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Fig. 4. The de/nition path.
and lvl(∀x:B)= lvl(∃ x:B)= lvl(B). We say that a de/nition is strati7ed if for every
clause ∀ Lx[H,B] of that de/nition, lvl(B)6 lvl(H). It is proved in [22] that cut can
be eliminated from intuitionistic logic extended with strati/ed de/nitions. In the rest
of this paper, when we use the term “de/nition” we shall mean “strati/ed de/nition”.
The following Lemma is similar to Lemma 5 and is proved similarly.
Lemma 11. The following pairs of inference rules do not permute over each other.
We write R1=R2 to mean an occurrence of inference rule R1 over inference rule R2.
∀L=∀R ⊃L= ⊃ R ∃R=∃L ∀L=∃L ∃R=defL
∀L=defL defR=defL
All other pairs of inference rules permute.
Let (; S; ) be an ats and let the primitive types  and  denote the type of the
elements in S and , respectively. Let one: → → → o be a predicate denoting the
one-step transition relation . Let ats2() be the de/nition given by the following set
of clauses:
ats2() = {one(p; a; q),  | (p; a; q) ∈ }:
To encode paths within a transition system we use the predicate multi : → list()→ 
→ o, which is de/ned by the de/nition path given in Fig. 4. The predicates one and
multi are assumed to have level 0. Here, members of ∗ are represented as terms of
type list() using nil : list() for the empty list and :: of type → list()→ list() for
the list constructor. The following proposition should be contrasted to Proposition 6;
its proof is simpler.
Proposition 12. Let (; S; ) be an ats. Then ats2(); pathmulti(p;w; q) if and only
if p w⇒ q.
The encoding ats2() is based on an extensional description of , hence the de/nition
will be in/nite if  is in/nite. In speci/c transition systems the transition relation might
be described structurally. This is the case for CCS, whose transitions can be encoded
as the de/nition ccs(A), given in Fig. 5. Here the combinators of CCS are typed as
follow: the action pre/x has type → → , the + and | both have type → → ,
and & has type (→ )→ . We assume the silent action ' :  is not a member of the
set A.
Observe that we are using meta-level -abstraction to encode &xP: such a term
is represented as &M , where M is meant to be the abstraction x:P. Thus the term
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Fig. 5. The de/nition ccs(A). Here, A is a non-empty set of actions.
Fig. 6. The de/nition sims.
P[&xP=x] can be represented simply by M (&M) without introducing an explicit notion
of substitution (-conversion in the meta-logic performs the necessary substitution).
The following result shows that CCS transitions are completely described by logical
derivability in ccs(A).
Proposition 13. The transition p a→ q holds if and only if ccs(A) one(p; a; q), and
p w⇒ q holds if and only if ccs(A); pathmulti(p;w; q).
This proposition can be proved by simple structural induction by showing that proofs
using the inference rules in Fig. 1 for CCS are essentially identical to sequent calculus
proofs over the corresponding clauses in the de/nition ccs(A). Notice that the sequent
calculus proofs involve only right-introduction rules.
If we explicitly represent the transition step by a predicate one (de/ned by ats2() or
by a system like ccs(A)), then it is possible to characterize simulation and bisimulation
as predicates sim and bisim given by the de/nition sims, presented in Fig. 6. Since the
level of one is 0, we need to assign to both sim and bisim the level 1 (or higher) in
order to make this de/nition strati/ed.
In order to prove that these encodings correctly capture simulation and bisimulation,
we need to show that we can restrict the use of the defL rule without aJecting
provability. Toward that end we introduce another version of the left introduction rule
for de/nitions, defLnc. This version is the same as defL but with the additional
restriction that the introduced atom is not a member of the side formulas on the left:
{B;O→ C |  ∈ csu(A;H) for some clause ∀ Lx:[H , B]}
A; → C
defLnc; provided A =∈ :
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As before, the variables Lx in this rule need to be chosen so that they are not free
in any formula of the lower sequent. We shall show that in a proof of the sequents
→ sim(p; q) or → bisim(p; q), this additional restriction does not aJect provability. We
shall call an instance of defL redundant if it is not an instance of defLnc. A proof in
which all instances of defL are instances of defLnc is a proof without redundancies.
Proposition 14. Let (; S; ) be an ats and let p; q∈ S.
• If ats2(); sims sim(p; q); then there is also a proof of → sim(p; q) without redund-
ancies; and
• If ats2(); sims  bisim(p; q); then there is also a proof of → bisim(p; q) without
redundancies.
The same holds if we replace ats2() by ccs(A) and restrict p and q to be 7nite
processes.
Proof. We shall show how to replace a redundant instance of defL at the root of a
proof by an instance of defLnc. By repeatedly removing such redundant instances, we
can convert a proof using defL into a proof using defLnc.
Consider a proof of A; →C in which that sequent is the consequence of a redundant
application of defL that introduces A. Thus, = {A} ∪ ′ for some ′ that does not
contain A. Also assume that this proof contains no other redundant occurrences of
defL. We shall transform this proof into one of A; ′→C that uses only defLnc. The
premise of this occurrence of defL is the set of sequents
{B;O→ C |  ∈ csu(A;H) for some clause ∀ Lx[H , B]}:
For each of the sequents B; A; ′→C we construct a proof of B; ′→C
as follows. Since there is a de/nitional clause ∀ Lx[H , B] such that A=H, there
is a proof of the sequent B→A using defR and initial. Using the cut-elimination
theorem of [22], we know there is a (cut-free) proof of B; ′→C. (Since the left-
hand side of the sequent is a set, we can combine the two occurrences of B.) We
can use all of these proofs of the sequents B; ′→C and an instance of the defL
rule to prove the sequent A; ′→C.
To guarantee that this new proof does not contain redundant occurrences of the
defL rule, we need to know that the cut-elimination process does not introduce new
redundant occurrences, and also that the implicit contraction on B in the premises
does not result in a new redundant occurrence.
The cut-elimination procedure in [22] can only introduce redundant occurrences of
the defL rule if there are occurrences of ⊃L or natL in the proof. An examination
of the relevant formulas and de/nitions reveals that the only formulas that will be on
the left-hand side of a sequent in a cut-free proof of → sim(p; q) or → bisim(p; q)
will be atomic formulas constructed using the predicate one (and the predicate comp
in the CCS case). Thus the proof will not contain occurrences of the ⊃L or natL
rules, so cut-elimination will not introduce redundant occurrences of defL.
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The implicit contraction of B will introduce a redundant occurrence of defL only
if B is the main formula of an occurrence of defL. Remember that B is the body of
a de/nitional clause ∀ Lx[H , B] such that ∈ csu(A;H), and A is an atomic formula
constructed using either one or comp. With the de/nition ats2(), B will always be the
formula , which cannot be the main formula of defL. With the de/nition ccs(A),
however, B may be another atomic formula constructed using one, and so may be the
main formula of defL. Since we have excluded the & operator, the /rst argument to
one in B is necessarily a subexpression of the /rst argument to one in A. This provides
us with a measure that guarantees that any new redundant occurrence of defL that is
introduced is strictly smaller than the one eliminated. Since our de/nition is /nite, the
original occurrence of defL will have a /nite number of premises, so at most a /nite
number of new redundant occurrences are introduced. As a result, we can apply the
elimination process to the new occurrences, and eventually the process will terminate.
We now introduce an inference rule similar to the SIM1 rule given above, namely
{→ sim(p′; q′) | (p′; q′) ∈ P}
→ sim(p; q) SIM2;
where P is a premise set for (p; q). We also present an inference rule for bisimulation:
{→ bisim(p′; q′) | (p′; q′) ∈ P} ∪ {→ bisim(q′; p′) | (q′; p′) ∈ Q}
→ bisim(p; q) BISIM2;
where P is a premise set for (p; q) and Q is a premise set for (q; p). Again, these rules
are /nitary if the ats is /nitely branching. In the case of CCS, one condition which
guarantees this property is that recursion variables in bodies of &-terms only occur
pre/xed. Let SIM2 →C (respectively, BISIM2 →C) denote the proposition that
the sequent →C can be proved using only occurrences of the SIM2 (respectively,
BISIM2) inference rule.
The following lemma is the analogue of Lemma 7 for this second encoding.
Lemma 15. Let (; S; ) be an ats and let p; q∈ S. Then:
• ats2(); sims  sim(p; q) if and only if SIM2 sim(p; q);
• ats2(); sims  bisim(p; q) if and only if BISIM2 bisim(p; q).
The same holds if we replace ats2() by ccs(A) and restrict p and q to be 7nite
processes.
Proof. We outline the proof of the /rst case; the second can be done similarly. Con-
sider a proof of the sequent → sim(p; q). This is provable only by a defR rule using
sims, and thus the sequent
→ ∀A∀P′:one(p; A; P′) ⊃ ∃Q′:one(q; A; Q′) ∧ sim(P′; Q′)
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must be provable. The only (cut-free) proof of this sequent must end in three occur-
rences of right-introduction rules and a proof of the sequent
one(p; A; P′)→ ∃Q′:one(q; A; Q′) ∧ sim(P′; Q′)
(here, A and P′ are variables introduced by the ∀R rule). By permuting inference
rules, we can assume that this latter sequent is proved with defL (or more precisely
defLnc) and that its premises, namely the sequents
→ ∃Q′:one(q; a; Q′) ∧ sim(p′; Q′);
where the pair (a; p′) ranges over 〈〈p〉〉, are each provable. Such a sequent is prov-
able only if the quanti/er ∃Q′ is instantiated with q′ where q a→ q′. Let P be the
premise set arising from collecting together all pairs (p′; q′) for such values p′ and q′.
Thus, our original sequent is provable if and only if for every (p′; q′)∈P the sequent
→ sim(p′; q′) is provable. The other direction follows by reversing these reasoning
steps.
Now the following can be proved using Lemma 15 in a manner analogous to the
proof of Theorem 8 using Lemma 7.
Theorem 16. Let (; S; ) be a noetherian ats; and let p and q be members of S.
Then
• ats2(); sims  sim(p; q) if and only if p q;
• ats2(); sims  bisim(p; q) if and only if p≡ q.
Concerning CCS, the full language is not noetherian because of the presence of
the recursion operator. If we consider only expressions without &, i.e. /nite processes,
then the same property holds, as is witnessed by the following theorem. We omit
the proof of this theorem since it is essentially the same as the preceding proof: the
main diJerence is that the de/nition of the one-step transitions for CCS is a recursive
de/nition.
Theorem 17. The following equivalences hold for 7nite processes p and q of CCS:
• ccs(A); sims  sim(p; q) if and only if p q;
• ccs(A); sims  bisim(p; q) if and only if p≡ q.
6. Innite behavior
As we mentioned in Section 2, a de/nition can be seen as de/ning the predicates
in the heads of the clauses by mutual recursion. Notice that we use the technique of
strati/cation to give meaning to de/nitions containing implications. For a discussion
on strati/ed speci/cations in the presence of negation (which can be reduced to a use
of implication), see, for example, [1]. We now examine how such recursive de/nitions
can be viewed as /xed points of suitable operators.
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The clauses for de/ning the level 0 predicate one (both for ats2() and for ccs(A))
are Horn clauses when , is replaced with reverse implication. The usual mean-
ing of predicates de/ned by Horn clauses is given by the least /xed point of the
monotone, one-step inference operator associated with the clauses [2]. In our case,
this interpretation for the predicate one coincides with the transition relation. That
is, one(p; a; p′) is a member of the least /xed point if and only if p a→p′. For the
de/nition ats2(), this is trivial, and for the de/nition ccs(A), this follows from Propo-
sition 13 and the fact that the least /xed point characterizes the set of atomic con-
sequences [2].
We now de/ne an analogous one-step inference operator associated with the de/ni-
tion sims. In that de/nition, simulation and bisimulation are predicates of level 1 and
the clauses are of the form ∀P∀Q[r(P;Q) , 5], where the formula 5 contains free
occurrences of the variables P and Q, strictly positive occurrences of the predicate r
(namely, sim or bisim), and both positive and negative occurrences of the predicate
one. With such a clause we associate a function 6 from binary relations to binary
relations whose de/nition corresponds to the formula 5, except that atomic formulas
of the form one(p; a; p′) are replaced with their denotation, namely, p a→p′. We are
following here the classical approach to the /xed point semantics of strati/ed de/ni-
tions: /rst, we determine the meaning of predicates of level lower than n; then their
meaning is used in the de/nition of the one-step inference operator for predicates of
level n. Since in the de/nition of the latter the predicate occurring negatively must
have level lower than n, this techniques ensures that the one-step inference operator
is monotone and thus has /xed points. In general, there will be more than one such
/xed point.
Notice that both defL and defR are sound for all the relations which are /xed
points of 6. To see this, assume that for any relation r there is only one such def-
initional clause (in case there are more, we group them in one clause which has as
body the disjunction of the bodies). Then observe that the use of defL corresponds
to replacing , by ⊃ in the clause, that is, to assuming the formula ∀P∀Q[r(P;Q)⊃5].
The case for defR corresponds to the converse: that is, to replacing ,
with ⊂.
Let 5s and 5b be the bodies of the clauses given in sims for sim and bisim, re-
spectively, and consider the following corresponding functions 6s and 6b, on binary
relations, associated with these formulas
6s(R) := {(P;Q) | ∀A∈∀P′ ∈ S if P A→P′ then ∃Q′ such that Q A→Q′ and
(P′; Q′)∈R};
6b(R) := {(P;Q) | [∀A∈∀P′ ∈ S if P A→P′ then ∃Q′ such that Q A→Q′ and
(P′; Q′)∈R] and [∀A∈∀Q′ ∈ S if Q A→Q′ then ∃P′
such that P A→P′ and (Q′; P′)∈R]}:
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We can see from their de/nitions that  and ≡ are the greatest /xed points of 6s
and 6b, respectively. Notice that in proofs of → sim(p; q) and → bisim(p; q) using
de/nitions ats2() and sims, defL is used with ats2() but not with sims.
As the following example shows, when the transition system is not noetherian, the
“if ” parts of Theorem 16 may not hold.
Example 18. Consider a transition system with two states only, p and q, and two
transitions p a→p and q a→ q. Then p q holds, but sim(p; q) cannot be proved. Notice
that an attempt to prove it would end up in a circularity.
Notice that ats2(); sims  sim(p; q) holds if and only if (p; q) is contained in
every /xed point of 6s and that ats2(); sims  bisim(p; q) holds if and only if (p; q)
is contained in every /xed point of 6b. In a noetherian ats, 6s and 6b have unique
/xed points, and it is for this reason that  and ≡ can be completely characterized in
a noetherian ats by provability (Theorem 16).
One attempt to characterize the greatest /xed point of the relation transformer 6
proof-theoretically is to introduce a notion of “proof with /nite or in/nite height”. An
!-proof of the sequent →C with inference rules taken from the set L is a tree whose
root is labeled by →C, and such that for every node N there is an instance of an
inference rule of L whose conclusion is the label of N , and whose premises are the
labels of the children of N . We will denote by !L →C the existence of an !-proof
in L for →C. For example, !SIM2 →C is true if →C has an !-proof using
only SIM2. If the set L of inference rules is determined by those in intuitionistic logic
and instances of defLnc and defR for some de/nition D, then we write D  ! →C.
Notice that an !-proof can have /nite or in/nite height, and that this is orthogonal to
the proof being /nitely or in/nitely branching, which is related to the possibility of
having in/nitary rules.
We prove now that Lemma 15 still holds for !-proofs.
Lemma 19. Let (; S; ) be an ats and let p; q∈ S. Then:
• ats2(); sims  ! sim(p; q) if and only if !SIM2 sim(p; q);
• ats2(); sims  ! bisim(p; q) if and only if BISIM2!bisim(p; q).
Proof. We outline the proof of the /rst case; the second can be done similarly. Since
the converse is immediate, we only show the forward direction. Assume that the sequent
→ sim(p; q) has an !-proof using the de/nition ats2(). Since this sequent must be
proved by one use of defR, two uses of ∀R, and one use of ⊃R, we have
ats2() ! one(p; A; P′)→ ∃q′[one(q; A; q′) ∧ sim(P′; q′)];
where A and P′ are variables. At this point, the proof can proceed by either defL or
∃R. If the choice is defL, then we quickly get that the proof is essentially an instance
of SIM2 at the root, and we proceed recursively through the !-proof. Otherwise, a use
of ∃R would give rise to a conjunction, the /rst component of which is one(q; A; q0)
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for some particular q0 ∈ S. It is not possible, however, to prove this atom using defR
since no instance of a clause in the de/nition ats1() has the variable A in its head.
Thus, this proof could not be built in that fashion.
It is important for this Lemma that we use defLnc (see Section 5) and not defL
since the latter can lead to in/nite sequences of redundant occurrences of defL.
We can now extend Theorem 16 to !-proofs and drop the noetherian condition.
Theorem 20. Let (; S; ) be an ats; and let p and q be members of S. Then
• ats2(); sims  ! sim(p; q) if and only if p q;
• ats2(); sims  ! bisim(p; q) if and only if p≡ q.
Proof. We prove only the /rst equivalence since the second follows similarly. First,
assume that ats2(); sims  ! sim(p; q): By Lemma 19, !SIM2 sim(p; q). Let : be a
proof of → sim(p; q) that contains just the SIM2 inference rule and let R be the
binary relation such that rRs if r→ s has an occurrence in :. It is easy to see that R
is a simulation containing (p; q).
Assume next that p q holds. We construct a monotonic sequence of trees {Tk}k∈!
such that for every k, the root of Tk is labeled by → sim(p; q), all the leaves of Tk are
labeled by sequents of the form → sim(p′; q′) where p′ q′ holds, and Tk+1 is obtained
from Tk by attaching to each leaf of Tk an appropriate instance of SIM2. T0 is the tree
consisting solely of the node labeled → sim(p; q). Given Tk , for every leaf labeled
→ sim(p′; q′), we know that p′ q′, so  contains pairs (p′1; q′1); : : : ; (p′m; q′m); : : : ;
where {(a1; p′1); : : : ; (am; p′m); : : :}= 〈〈p′〉〉 and {(a1; q′1); : : : ; (am; q′m); : : :}⊆ 〈〈q〉〉 for
some actions a1; : : : ; am; : : : : Hence in Tk+1 the sequent p′→ q′ can be placed at the
conclusion of a SIM2 rule, whose premises are p′1→ q′1; : : : ; p′m→ q′m; : : : : The limit of
this sequence {Tk}k∈! is an !-proof for sim(p; q) using occurrences of the SIM2 rule.
The application of Lemma 19 yields the conclusion ats2(); sims  ! sim(p; q).
For Lemma 19 and Theorem 20 to hold, it is important that the relation one be
de/ned in a “noetherian” way itself. If we consider a recursive de/nition for one, like
in ccs(A) (with the clause for &), then the reverse direction of these equivalences
does not necessarily hold, as the following example illustrates.
Example 21. The CCS terms &xx and &xa:x are such that neither !SIM2 sim(&xa:x; &xx)
nor &xa:x &xx hold. However; the judgment ccs(A); sims  ! sim(&xa:x; &xx) holds.
In fact, notice that &xx
a→ &xa:x does not hold, while ccs(A)! one(&xx; a; &xa:x).
The in/nite proof of one(&xx; a; &xa:x) is in a sense an “in/nite failure”. If we restrict
to /nite CCS processes, then such in/nite failures do not occur with respect to the one
step transition steps and the only in/nite proof behaviors will be those that positively
verify the greatest /xed point properties of simulation and bisimulation. Thus, when
restricted to /nite CCS processes, the variation of Theorem 20 where ats2() is replaced
with ccs(A) holds.
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7. An inductive encoding of simulation and bisimulation
In previous sections we have shown how to encode in sequent calculus various
relations over the states of a transition system. We now explore the kinds of properties
on the relations that can be proved within the calculus or via some characterization
provided by the calculus. We will see that several properties cannot be proved within
the logic because their proof requires inductive reasoning. We will then discuss one
possible approach to enhance sequent calculus with induction.
Example 22. The property “bisimulation is preserved by the pre/x operator” holds
in CCS. The corresponding encoding of this property is also provable in the sequent
calculus; that is, we have
ccs(A); sims  ∀A∀P∀Q[bisim(P;Q) ⊃ bisim(A:P; A:Q)]
which is easy to verify.
Example 23. The properties “bisimulation is symmetric” and “bisimulation is transi-
tive” hold in any transition system. The corresponding encodings of these two properties
are also provable in the sequent calculus; that is, we have
ats2(); sims  ∀P∀Q[bisim(P;Q) ⊃ bisim(Q; P)]
and
ats2(); sims  ∀P∀Q∀R[bisim(P;Q) ∧ bisim(Q; R) ⊃ bisim(P; R)]
both of which are easy to verify.
As the following examples illustrate, there are plenty of properties of ≡ and  that
cannot be proved within the logic. In fact, as we already observed, we can prove
properties of sim and bisim only if they are true for every /xed point of 6s and 6b,
but in the non-noetherian case there is in general more than one /xed point.
Example 24. The property “bisimulation equivalence implies the largest simulation”
(or more formally: ≡ is a subset of ) is true in any transition system. This property
can be expressed by the formula ∀P∀Q[bisim(P;Q)⊃ sim(P;Q)] but, in general, if  is
a non-noetherian transition relation, this formula cannot be proved using the de/nitions
ats2() and sims. For example, if we take the transition system ({a}; {p}; {(p; a; p)})
it is immediate to see that {(p;p)} is a bisimulation (the greatest /xed point of 6b,
namely bisimulation equivalence) and ∅ is a simulation (the least /xed point of 6s).
Hence, this formula cannot be proved for this transition system.
Example 25. The property “bisimulation equivalence is reKexive” holds in any tran-
sition system. The formula ∀P[bisim(P; P)] cannot be proved using the de/nitions
ats2() and sims. Consider for instance the same transition system as in Example 24:
the empty set ∅ is a bisimulation (the least /xed point of 6b), and it is, of course, not
reKexive.
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Example 26. The property “bisimulation equivalence is preserved by the + operator”
is true in CCS. This property can be expressed as the formula ∀P∀Q∀R[bisim(P;Q)⊃
bisim(P + R;Q + R)]. This sequent cannot be proved using ccs(A) and sims. In fact,
take P= a:0, Q= a:0+a:0 and R= &xa:x. The least /xed point of 6b contains the pair
(a:0; a:0 + a:0) but not the pair (a:0 + &xa:x; a:0 + a:0 + &xa:x).
The notion of “in/nite proof”, introduced in the previous section, can be help-
ful to prove properties on the de/ned relations at the meta (mathematical) level.
For instance, the properties in Examples 24 and 25 can both be proved by using
the characterization of ≡ and  provided at the end of the previous section. It is
easy to see, in fact, that ccs(A); sims ! bisim(P; P). Concerning the implication
bisim(P;Q)⊃ sim(P;Q), observe that any in/nite proof for → bisim(P;Q) contains
an in/nite proof of → sim(P;Q).
The characterization of simulation or bisimulation using !-proofs is not so helpful
because the existence of an in/nite proof for a given sequent is co-semidecidable but
(in general) not semidecidable. A better approach would be to use induction to capture
the greatest /xed point.
In particular, de/ne the binary relations i and ≡i for each natural number i as
follows. Both 0 and ≡0 are de/ned to be S × S, and i+1 :=6s(i) and ≡i+1
:=6b(≡i). Now set ! :=
⋂
i i and ≡! :=
⋂
i ≡i.
It is easy to show that for /nitely branching transition systems, 6s and 6b are
downward-continuous and, hence,  equals ! and ≡ equals ≡!. A simple induction
shows that for i¿0,  ⊆ i and ≡ ⊆ ≡i and thus  ⊆ ! and ≡ ⊆ ≡!. The
converse needs the /nitely branching assumption and follows from Theorem 5:6 of
[25]. In CCS, /nite branching is guaranteed whenever all the recursion variables in
&-expressions are pre/xed.
Thus, one approach to showing that two states are bisimilar is to show that for
all natural numbers i, those two states are related by ≡i. Such statements can often
be proved by induction on natural numbers. We can incorporate induction into our
proof systems by introducing natural numbers using z for zero and s for successor and




→ Q(z) Q(y)→ Q(s(y)) ;Q(x)→ P
nat(x); → P natL .
Here, x, P, and Q are schematic variables of these inference rule, and y is a vari-
able not free in Q. The /rst two rules can be seen as right-introduction rules for nat
while the third rule, encoding induction over natural numbers, can be seen as a left-
introduction rule. In the left-introduction rule, Q ranges over formulas with one variable
extracted (say, using -abstraction) and represents the property that is proved by induc-
tion: the third premise of that inference rule witnesses the fact that, in general, Q will
express a property stronger than P. The paper [22] contains a proof that cut-elimination
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Fig. 7. The ssims de/nition for indexed simulation and bisimulation. Free variables are assumed to be
universally quanti/ed at the top level of clauses.
holds for intuitionistic logic extended with both these rules for natural numbers and
with strati/ed de/nitions. Notice that with this formulation of induction, cut-free proofs
will not have the subformula property. We use N to denote provability using both
left- and right-introduction rules for de/nitions as well as the above-mentioned left-
and right-rules for natural numbers. If n is a natural number, we write Ln to denote the
corresponding “numeral” for n: that is, Ln is the term containing n occurrences of s and
one occurrence of z.
We can now encode i and ≡i by using the indexed versions of sim and bisim
given by the relations ssim and sbisim, respectively, de/ned in Fig. 7. We will denote
this de/nition as ssims. The following proposition shows how a proof using induction
can yield proofs that do not involve induction.
Proposition 27. Let (; S; ) be an ats; and let p and q be members of S. If ats2();
ssimsN sim(p; q) then for every natural number n; ats2(); ssims  ssim( Ln; p; q). If
ats2(); ssimsN bisim(p; q) then for every natural number n; ats2(); ssims  sbisim
( Ln; p; q).
Proof. We prove the /rst result about simulation: the result about bisimulation is
analogous. A cut-free proof of the sequent → sim(p; q) must end in a defR rule, which
(using ∀R and ⊃R also) means that the sequent nat(k)→ ssim(k; p; q) is provable,
where k is a variable. Call this proof :. Now let n be a natural number. It is possible
to substitute Ln for the variable k into the proof : to obtain the proof :[ Ln=k] of the
sequent nat( Ln)→ ssim( Ln; p; q). (Such substitution into proofs is not completely trivial:
for example, when substituting into an occurrence of defL, some premises many no
longer appear in the resulting proof. For details, see [22].) Given that n is a natural
number, it is easy to construct a cut-free proof of → nat( Ln), one using only the right
rules for nat. Now placing these two proofs together with a cut rule yields
→ nat( Ln) nat( Ln)→ ssim( Ln; p; q)
→ ssim( Ln; p; q) cut:
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Given the cut-elimination result for this logic involving de/nitions and induction [22],
we can conclude that → ssim( Ln; p; q) has a cut-free proof. Since the predicate nat does
not appear in the de/nition of ssim or in any de/nitional clause on which it relies, the
resulting proof does not contain any occurrences of induction.
Proposition 28. Let (; S; ) be an ats; p and q be members of S; and n be a natural
number. If ats2(); ssims  ssim( Ln; p; q) then pn q. If ats2(); ssims sbisim( Ln; p; q)
then p ≡n q.
Proof. We prove the /rst result about simulation: the result about bisimulation is
analogous. Assume that n is 0. Then p0 q holds immediately. Otherwise, let n be
m + 1. Assume that ats2(); ssims  ssim(s( Lm); p; q). An analysis of the inference
rules in cut-free proofs using the permutation of inference rules described in Lemma 11
shows that for some premise set P, there is a subproof of the sequent → ssim( Lm;p′; q′)
for every (p′; q′)∈P. Using the inductive assumption, p′m q′ for all (p′; q′)∈P.
Hence, by the de/nition of 6s, we have pm+1 q.
Putting these results together with the one mentioned earlier regarding when 6s and
6b are downward continuous, we can prove the following.
Corollary 29. If ats2(); ssimsN sim(p; q) then p! q. If ats2(); ssimsN
bisim(p; q) then p ≡! q. If the abstract transition system is 7nitely branching; then
we can conclude the stronger fact that p q or p≡ q.
In this full proof system, it is possible to prove bisimilarity also for non-noetherian
ats’s. In particular, it is possible to prove that bisim is reKexive (and together with
Example 23, that bisim is an equivalence relation). Below we list some properties that
can only be proved by using induction (along with the de/nitions ccs(A) and ssims).
bisim(&xa:x; &x(a:x + a:x)) Example of bisimilar in/nite
processes
∀P bisim(P + 0; P) 0 is neutral element for +
∀P bisim(P + P; P) + is idempotent
∀P;Q (bisim(P;Q) ⊃ sim(P;Q)) cf : Example 24
∀P bisim(P; P) ReKexivity; cf : Example 25
∀P;Q; R (bisim(P;Q) ⊃ bisim(P + R;Q + R)) + preserves bisim;
cf : Example 26
We leave the construction of the proofs of these theorems to the reader.
8. Conclusion
It has been observed before that intuitionistic and linear logics can be used to specify
transition systems. In this paper, we have shown that if logic is extended with de/ni-
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tions, then certain properties about elements of transition systems, namely simulation
and bisimulation, can be captured naturally. Furthermore, if induction over integers is
added, then we can increase the expressiveness of logic to establish more high-level
facts about these properties, such as the fact that bisimulation is an equivalence relation.
From a high-level point-of-view, we can characterize the experiments we have re-
ported here in two ways. From a (traditional) logic programming point of view, a
de/nition D is generally either a set of (positive) Horn clauses or an extension of
them that allows negated atoms in the body of clauses. In that case, sequents in a
proof of D  A, for atomic formula A, are either of the form →B or B→ . In the
/rst case, defR is used to establish B and, in the second case, defL is used to build
a /nite refutation of B. In this paper, we consider richer de/nitions so that the search
for proofs must consider sequents of the form B→C; with such sequents, both left-
and right-introduction of de/nitions are used together. From a computational or con-
currency point-of-view, proofs using just defR only capture the may behavior of a
system: “there exists a computation such that : : :” is easily translated to “there exists
a proof (in the sense of ) of : : :”. The addition of the defL inference rule allows
capturing certain forms of must behavior.
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